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Abstract  
Purpose: This research investigates the difference between South Africa (SA) and the United 
Kingdom (UK) in terms of data protection compliance with the aim to establish if a country 
that has had data protection in place for a longer period of time has a higher level of 
compliance with data protection requirements in comparison with a country that is preparing 
for compliance. 
Design/methodology/approach: An insurance industry multi-case study within the online in-
surance services environment was conducted. Personal Information (PI) of four newly created 
consumer profiles was deposited to 10 random insurance organisation websites in each 
country to evaluate a number of data privacy requirements of the Data Protection Act (DPA) 
and Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA). 
Findings: The results demonstrate that not all the websites honored the selected opt-out 
preferences as direct marketing material from the insurance organisations in the sample was 
sent to both the SA and UK consumer profiles. Forty-two unsolicited third party contacts 
were received by the SA consumer profiles whereas the UK consumer profiles did not receive 
any third party direct marketing. It was also found that the minimality principle is not always 
met by both SA and UK organisations.  
Research implications: As a jurisdiction with a heavy stance towards privacy implementation 
and regulation, it was found that the UK is more compliant than SA in terms of 
implementation of the evaluated data protection requirements included in the scope of this 
study, however not fully compliant. 
Originality/value: Based upon the results obtained from this research, it suggests that the SA  
insurance organisations should ensure that the non-compliance aspects relating to direct mar-
keting and sharing data with third parties are addressed. SA insurance companies should learn 
from the manner in which the UK insurance organisations implement these privacy 
requirements. Furthermore, the UK insurance organisations should focus on improved 
compliance for direct marking and the minimality principle. The study indicate the positive 
role that data protection legislation plays in a county like the UK with a more mature stance 
toward compliance with data protection legislation. 
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1 Introduction 
Personal Information (PI) or data is regarded as the new oil in the digital world – a strategic asset, and 
even a product in itself (The Economist, 2017; Sarkhel and Alawadhi, 2017). Since there is an enormous 
amount of PI collected in cyberspace, organisations are able to gain a competitive advantage through 
targeted marketing, product customisation (Spiekerman et al.,  2015) and the use of value chains 
(European Commission DG Connect, 2013) to deliver tailored services and products to consumers; 
nonetheless, the consequences of the utilisation and access to the information of consumers result in 
consumers experiencing unsolicited marketing emails, invasion of the consumers privacy and fraud 
(Martin and Murphy, 2017). Studies conducted by Martin (2015) indicated that consumer concerns are 
reduced if there is increased control by the consumers of their PI and implementation of strong regula-
tory controls. The importance of regulatory controls has been highlighted by Pelteret and Ophoff (2016, 
p. 291) as,  “Privacy has become a prominent legal issue, with debate about it spurred by constant im-
provement in technology. With the advent of big data and cloud computing, the legal issues around 
information privacy have become more complex as data is transported across country boundaries.”  Re-
search conducted by EMC2 Corporation in 15 countries found that 87% of respondents agreed that there 
should be legislation to prohibit organizations from trading consumers data without the ‘opt-in’ consent 
(Dell EMC, 2015). 
There are over 100 countries with enacted data protection regulations (Greenleaf, 2013). Although these 
regulations focus on the protection of personal data, the definitions of privacy as well as the conditions 
for processing and protection vary (Spiekerman et al., 2015). Furthermore, the regulations are enforced 
more robustly in some jurisdictions, and more moderately in others (DLA Piper, 2018).  
The research study reported on in this paper focuses on the data protection jurisdictions of South Africa 
(SA) and United Kingdom (UK). The South African Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) 
(South Africa, 2013) was signed into law in 2013, and South Africa is regarded as a country in which 
regulation and enforcement are moderately applied (DLA Piper, 2018). As a consequence, massive data 
breaches of PI of South Africans were reported during the last five years. The Master Deed’s breach of 
around 60 million SA citizens’ identity numbers and addresses were the largest to date. Jigsaw Holdings 
(a holding company for real estate firms) had stored the information on an unprotected open web server 
(Fihlani, 2017). In another incident, Liberty Holdings, an insurance organisation, received a ransom 
request for the company’s email repository (Malinga, 2018).  In May 2018, the SA Hawks, State Secu-
rity Agency and the Information Regulator started an investigation of the breach of PI of 943,000 South 
African drivers. The PI, such as ID numbers and email addresses were stored on the ViewFines website 
in plain text (Etheridge, 2018). In contrast, the UK Data Protection Act (DPA) (Great Britain, 1998) has 
been in effect since 2000, and in the UK regulation and enforcement are considered to be robustly ap-
plied (DLA Piper, 2018). The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the UK has issued various 
fines to organisations found to have sold PI for marketing purposes, and to have sent unsolicited text 
messages or emails. In recent cases the ICO fined Home Logic UK Ltd (ICO, 2017a) £50,000 for making 
marketing calls and Moneysupermarket.com (ICO, 2017b) £80,000 for sending marketing emails which 
recipients did not consent to. In another example, AMS Marketing Ltd was fined £100,000 for making 
nuisance calls to customers who had opted out for receiving direct marketing calls (ICO 2018b). The 
maturity and classification of the two approaches differ sufficiently to merit a comparison of practice. 
 
Informed consent is a principle covered by both POPIA and the DPA. Many argue that informed consent 
is obtained through the opt-out model, in terms of which the user must actively decline or refuse per-
mission for certain processing or use of their PI if they do not want it used in this way. In comparison, 
the user gives informed consent for certain processing or use of their information within the opt-in 
 
 
model; this is regarded as requiring less effort on the part of the user, and is considered better than the 
opt-out model in terms of advantage to the user (Noain-Sánchez, 2016). This is made possible using 
active data collection, whereby an individual knowingly and willingly provides PI on a website (Swire 
and Berman, 2007). Informed consent also applies when PI is collected online and where organisations 
plan to use the PI for direct marketing purposes.  
For the purpose of this research, informed consent was investigated in the context of obtaining consent 
for marketing preferences at the time of obtaining online insurance quotes. A case study was conducted 
in both SA and the UK in which consent for direct marketing, the secure processing of PI, the use of 
privacy policies on websites, third party sharing of PI, collection of sensitive PI and the principle of 
minimality in the two countries were compared from a regulatory and compliance perspective in order 
to make recommendations for improved compliance. 
2 Research Objectives  
The objective of the research is to compare aspects of data protection compliance between SA and the 
UK to establish if a country that has had data protection in place for a longer period of time had a higher 
level of compliance with data protection requirements compared to a country that is preparing for com-
pliance. The results can be used to make recommendations for non-compliance aspects to aid organisa-
tions by learning from good practice towards the implementation and regulation of privacy. 
The data protection requirements in POPIA and the DPA are similar (Botha et al., 2017; Da Veiga, 
2017) and both pieces of legislation incorporate the privacy principles of the Guidelines on the Protec-
tion of Personal Information and Trans-border Flow of Personal Data (OECD, 2013) as well as the Fair 
Information Practice Principles (FIPPS, 2018). As such data privacy implementation in these two coun-
tries can be compared. Similar data protection requirements from POPIA and the DPA that could be 
tested when PI is deposited via a website were selected for the comparison. Consideration was also given 
to requirements that can be evaluated from a consumer perspective as to whether the consumer will 
experience that his/her privacy rights, as outlined in the respective regulations, were upheld. As such 
the following aspects were included for the evaluation: the openness principle whereby consumers must 
be notified of the purposes and other conditions of processing (typically through an online privacy pol-
icy), the secure processing of PI (using Hyper Text Transport Protocol Secure (HTTPS)), the consent 
for direct marketing (through opt-in for receiving or opting-out to decline) and consent for third party 
sharing of PI (thereby not receiving unwanted communication from third parties), collection of sensitive 
PI (not collecting sensitive PI without consent or unnecessarily), and the principle of minimality (not 
collecting more PI than what is necessary for the purpose). 
It is recognised that privacy perceptions differ between consumers (Morton and Sasse, 2014; Kumara-
guru and Cranor, 2005). Moreover, cultural aspects also play a role in privacy perception (Greenleaf, 
2013; Bygrave, 2010) and even national culture (Da Veiga 2018; Hoffstede et al., 2010). While the 
aforementioned also play a role in privacy implementation in a country the requirements of the DPA 
and POPIA were used from a regulatory perspective as the theoretical basis to evaluate the implemen-
tation of the privacy requirements in this study. The scope of this research is therefore limited to organ-
isations, being the responsible party, who must implement certain privacy requirements in line with the 
DPA and POPIA requirements and consumers on the other hand who should through their interaction 
with the organisation experience that their privacy rights are maintained in line with the regulatory re-
quirements. 
3 Overview of POPIA and the DPA 
POPIA and the DPA are both based on the OECD privacy principles (Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, 2013), namely accountability, processing or use limitation, collection lim-
itation, purpose specification, information quality, openness, security safeguards, and data subject par-
ticipation or access. Both pieces of legislation further include the concept of sensitive PI and cross-
border data transfer limitations. POPIA covers breach notification, whereas the DPA does not include 
 
 
it, but the Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations of 2003 require that organisations notify 
the ICO in the event of a data breach of personal data (DLA Piper, 2018). Table 1 illustrates the condi-
tions of POPIA that maps to the principles of the DPA (Botha et al., 2017; Da Veiga, 2017). The General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mapping is also considered as organisations in the UK might in 
future also have to comply with its requirements. Table 1 includes a mapping to the OECD privacy 
principles and FIPPS, indicating that similar privacy principles are covered by both acts allowing for 
the comparison. The last column indicates which of the principles were selected for inclusion in scope 
of this study.  
Privacy Condition/Principle FIPPs OECD POPIA SA DPA UK GDPR Included in Scope 
Accountability Y Y Y N Y N 
Processing/use limitation Y Y Y Y Y N 
Collection limitation/minimality Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Purpose specification Y Y Y Y Y N 
Further processing limitation N N Y Y Y N 
Information quality Y Y Y Y Y N 
Openness Y Y Y Y Y N 
Security safeguards and third parties Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Data subject participation / access Y Y Y Y Y N 
DPO/ IO required N N Y Y Y N 
Breach notification N N Y N Y N 
Cross-border data transfer limitations N N Y Y Y N 
Direct marketing N N Y Y Y Y 
Online privacy N N N N Y N 
Sensitive PI N N Y Y Y Y 
Table 1. Mapping of standards/act requirements to privacy compliance evaluation 
The next section provides an overview of the two regulations.  
3.1 Overview of POPIA  
The PI of SA citizens is protected by the South African Constitution in terms of the common law and 
the right to privacy as a fundamental human right (South Africa, 1996). POPIA (South Africa, 2013) 
regulates the processing of PI by public and private organisations domiciled in SA. It defines PI as 
“information relating to an identifiable, living, natural person, and where it is applicable, an identifiable, 
existing juristic person” (South Africa 2013, p. 14), being the data subject. This includes information 
such as a person’s name, race, language, sex, pregnancy, marital status, and national, ethnic or social 
origin; information relating to a person’s educational level or medical or financial status; the biometric 
information of a person; the personal opinions or preferences of a person; and even correspondence.  
POPIA refers to the organisation that defines the purpose and means of processing of the PI as the 
“responsible party”. There are eight conditions for the processing of PI namely: 
• accountability,  
• processing limitation,  
• purpose specification,  
• further processing limitation,  
• information quality,  
• openness,  
• security safeguards and 
• data subject participation.  
 
 
 
Processing of special PI, rights regarding direct marketing and transborder information flows are ad-
dressed as separate chapters in the law. Two conditions are relevant for this research project namely, 
condition 6 relating to openness, condition 7 relating to security safeguards and the chapter regarding 
direct marketing requirements. Provisions are also included for the establishment of an Information 
Regulator. Only the sections relating to the Information Regulator have been enforced to date. The In-
formation Regulator chairperson and members were appointed in December 2016 and have subse-
quently established the Information Regulator website (Information Regulator South Africa, 2018).  
3.2 Overview of the DPA  
In the UK, personal data that is stored on computers or in an organised paper filing system is regulated 
by the Data Protection Act of 1998 (Great Britain, 1998). The DPA regulates the processing and move-
ment of personal data for all purposes other than domestic use. Section 1.1 of the DPA defines personal 
data as “data which relate to a living individual who can be identified (a) from those data or (b) from 
those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession 
of, the data controller.” According to the ICO guidelines entitled “Determining what is personal data”, 
examples of personal data include a person’s name, place of work, medical history, and telephone num-
ber (ICO, 2012). 
The DPA defines how personal data are (or are to be) processed by the data controller. The data con-
troller needs to follow eight principles to ensure that personal data are processed lawfully. Those eight 
principles are listed in Schedule 1 of the DPA and relate to: 
• fair and lawful processing,  
• specific and lawful purposes,  
• adequate and relevant to the purpose of processing,  
• ensuring accuracy,  
• not keeping PI for longer than necessary,  
• processing in accordance with data subject rights,  
• appropriate technical and organisational measures and  
• transborder flow requirements.  
 
The rights of data subjects include the right to prevent processing for purposes of direct marketing. This 
right together with principles 2, 3 and 7 are deemed relevant to this research study. Principle 2 relates 
to personal data that will not be further processed if the aim of the usage is incompatible with the original 
purpose of collecting the data (such as further processing relating to direct marketing), principle 3 relates 
to the minimality principle, and principle 7 establishes appropriate technical measures to be taken 
against unauthorised processing of the personal data.  
 
4 Overview of Specific Regulatory Requirements 
With the aim to compare how organisations in SA and the UK meet the respective privacy requirements, 
a number of key requirements of POPIA and the DPA were selected, namely direct marketing, openness 
using online privacy policies, secure processing and third party sharing. Detailed overviews of these 
requirements are presented in the next section. 
4.1 Overview of Direct Marketing Consent Requirements 
POPIA defines direct marketing as communication whereby goods or services are offered to a data 
subject in person, by mail or via electronic communication (South Africa, 2013). Section 69 of POPIA 
deals with direct marketing using unsolicited electronic communications. A responsible party may con-
tact a data subject only if consent has been obtained, or if the data subject is an existing consumer and 
communication relates to similar products or services. New consumers may be contacted only once, 
 
 
with consent (opt-in) being required for continued communication. Consent in POPIA refers to “any 
voluntary, specific and informed expression of will in terms of which permission is given for the pro-
cessing of personal information” (South Africa, 2013, p. 12). In terms of POPIA, consent for direct 
marketing is given through consumers electing to opt in. Until POPIA is enacted, the Consumer Protec-
tion Act (CPA) of 2010 (South Africa, 2008) gives consumers the right to restrict unwanted direct mar-
keting by opting out. The Information Regulator published a media statement where they emphasised 
their constitutional mandate to give effect to the right to privacy under which section 69 should also be 
interpreted (Information Regulator, 2018). 
 
Similar to the definition given in POPIA, Section 11 of the DPA describes direct marketing as commu-
nications of any advertising or marketing material that are sent to a particular individual (Great Britain, 
1998, s 11). In its document entitled “Direct Marketing,” the ICO (2016) presents a number of direct 
marketing examples, such as a bank contacting a consumer regarding the administration of their bank 
account and at the same time also introducing its mortgage products. The same section regulates an 
individual’s right to prevent their PI from being processed for the purposes of direct marketing. The 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations (Great Britain) 2003 provide more 
detailed privacy rules for an individual in relation to electronic communications (e.g. email), as these 
were designed to complement the DPA in respect of people’s privacy rights (Great Britain, 2003). From 
the data controller’s point of view, individuals can be contacted (e.g. via email, telephone or text mes-
sage) only if they have consented to this (e.g. by means of opt-in or opt-out boxes) (ICO, 2016).  
This requirement can be tested by evaluating if websites include an opt-in or opt-out option that con-
sumers can select to indicate their preference in receiving direct marketing. The compliance of the or-
ganisation with the consumer preferences can be monitored through the direct marketing communication 
received on the personal email or cell phone numbers provided by a consumer. Figure 1 shows an ex-
ample of how websites could include the opt-in option for marketing preferences.  
 
  
Figure 1: Opt-in for marketing (Siruss, 2018) 
 
4.2 Overview of Openness Using an Online Privacy Policy 
Where PI is captured actively on websites, the website should include a link to a privacy policy or notice 
that is clear and easy to access (Swire and Berman 2007). This privacy policy should explain to the data 
subject what their PI will be used for and with whom it will be shared, and thus ensure that the data 
subject is aware of the purpose of information collection and other aspects to meet the requirements of 
the openness condition/principle. 
 
 
POPIA requires the responsible party to notify the data subject about a number of aspects by means of 
a privacy policy or notice disclosing all the means by which the organisation collects, uses and discloses 
PI (South Africa, 2013, s 18). Principle 1 of DPA Schedule 1 states that “Personal data shall be pro-
cessed fairly and lawfully”. One of the ways to uphold this principle is to provide, in a privacy policy, 
additional information on how personal information is collected and processed, who the data controller 
is and the purpose for which the information will be processed (ICO, n.d.).  
This requirement can be checked by establishing if websites have a privacy policy or includes privacy 
notices in their terms and conditions. Figure 2 illustrates a website sign-up form with both non-compliant 
and compliant examples in terms of agreeing to the terms and conditions and privacy policy (Siruss, 
2018).  
 
 
Figure 2: Agreeing to the terms and conditions and privacy policy (Siruss, 2018) 
4.3 Overview of Secure Processing Requirements for Websites 
Condition 7 of POPIA requires that a responsible party must secure the integrity and confidentiality of 
PI that it processes by applying technical and organisational measures to protect it (South Africa 2013, 
s 19(1)). As mentioned earlier, principle 7 of Schedule 1 of the DPA states that proper security controls 
should be used to protect PI from being misused. More specifically, the ICO document entitled “Pro-
tecting personal data online services” provides guidelines on various security mechanisms that can be 
used to protect PI online, including configuration of Secure Socket Layer, good password usage, and 
software security updates (ICO, 2014). This will aid in preventing the loss, destruction, unauthorised 
access and processing of PI.  In addition, it is also the responsibility of the responsible party to inform 
the data subject if a data breach occurs. For the purpose of this research, the use of HTTPS as one of the 
various security mechanisms was considered owing to the ease of identifying it for the case study.  
 
The security processing of PI via websites can therefore as a minimum requirement  
(although not the only) be verified by checking if an organisation’s website uses HTTPS when a con-
sumer deposits his/her PI on the websites, especially where sensitive PI is collected. 
 
 
4.4 Overview of Third Party Requirements 
Consent for direct marketing does not constitute consent to share or sell PI to third parties for direct 
marketing. Section 18 of POPIA requires a responsible party to take reasonable practical steps to notify 
the data subject of the recipient or categories of recipients of their PI. Furthermore, PI may be supplied 
to third parties only if this serves the legitimate interests of the responsible party or third party (South 
Africa 2013, s 11(f)). It is important to note that the purpose of collecting the PI must be explicitly 
stated, and must be lawful (South Africa 2013, s 13(1)). Any sharing of PI with a third party should be 
communicated to the data subject and must be in line with the original purpose of collection. Where PI 
is shared with a third party for legitimate reasons there must be a written contract in place between the 
responsible party and the third party outlining the security requirements to ensure that the integrity and 
confidentiality of the PI is secured (South Africa 2013, s 20 and s 21). It is the responsibility of the 
responsible party to ensure that a contract is in place stipulating the security measures and to ensure that 
the security measures are maintained (South Africa 2013, s 21). 
The openness condition of POPIA stipulates that, “If personal information is collected, the responsible 
party must take reasonably practicable steps to ensure that the data subject is aware of—…(h) any fur-
ther information such as the – (i) recipient or category of recipients of the information” (South Africa 
2013, s 18. (h)(i)). A responsible party may not transfer PI to a third party in a foreign country unless 
certain provisions are in place, such as a binding code of conduct or contract, or unless the data subject 
consents to this (South Africa 2013, s 69). 
Section 70(1) of the DPA defines a third party as any person other than “a) the data subject, b) the data 
controller or c) any data processor or other person authorised to process data for the data controller or 
processor”. In terms of data sharing, Schedule 3 Section 4 of the DPA states that disclosure of sensitive 
personal data to third parties can be processed only if the consent of the individual is given. As a result, 
many data collectors use a privacy notice to explain to individuals how their personal data will be pro-
cessed (e.g. the sharing of their data with third parties if required) during the data collection phase (Au-
diencedatasharing, n.d.) and the individuals can then decide whether to give permission to the data col-
lector to allow third parties to use their personal data.  
This requirement can be evaluated by establishing if websites notify consumers or obtain consent for 
sharing the consumer’s PI with third parties. In addition, compliance can be verified through the com-
munications which the consumer receives on his/her email or cell phone number as deposited on the 
website, which should not include third parties that are not related to the purpose of sharing the PI. 
Figure 3 shows an example of how the opt-in for sharing with third parties can be phrased  (itseeze 
websites, 2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Opt-in for third party sharing (itseeze websites 2018) 
4.5 Overview of the Minimality Principle 
 
The minimality principle in both POPIA and the DPA are similar in that it requires responsible parties 
to ensure that the PI collected must be adequate, relevant and not excessive. The ICO published guide-
lines on their website explaining adequacy as being, “sufficient to properly fulfil your stated purpose”; 
relevant, as having, “a rational link to that purpose”; and limited as being, not processing, “more than 
you need for that purpose.” (ICO, 2018b). Online organisations therefore have the responsibility to en-
sure that the fields of PI collected online is not excessive whilst ensuring that the accuracy of collected 
PI is maintained as well as the security. For the purpose of this research the fields of PI collected can be 
evaluated to determine if all fields collected are necessary to fulfil the purpose for obtaining online 
insurance quotes.  
 
4.6 Overview of Sensitive Personal Information 
 
The definition of sensitive PI in both POPIA and the DPA relates to the religious or philosophical be-
liefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership, political persuasion, health or sex life or biometric 
information of a data subject as well as the criminal behaviour or offences. Section 27 of POPIA requires 
that sensitive PI may only be processed if the data subject provides consent; if it is necessary for a 
defence of obligation of law; it relates to historical, statistical or research purposes in line with certain 
provisions that apply. The DPA specifically includes the word “explicit” where consent must be ob-
tained for the processing of PI. Where explicit consent is not obtained one of the other provisions in 
Schedule 3 of the DPA must apply, such as when the processing is necessary for legal proceedings, if it 
is in the vital interests of the data subject or another person or for medical purposes. 
 
4.7 Summary of Regulatory Requirements to be Tested 
 
The regulatory requirements that will be tested in the scope of this research study is summarised in Table 
2. Column one portrays the relevant condition followed by the regulatory requirements of POPIA and 
the DPA in columns two and three respectively. A summarised purpose is provided in column four with 
a description of how the requirement will be tested within the scope of this research. 
  
 
 
Condition / 
principle 
Regulatory requirement POPIA Regulatory requirement DPA Purpose Requirement to 
be tested 
Openness 
principle 
Condition 6: Notification to data subject when collecting personal infor-
mation 
18. (1) If personal information is collected, the responsible party must take 
reasonably practicable steps to ensure that the data subject is aware of— 
(a) the information being collected and where the information is not collected 
from the data subject, the source from which it is collected; 
(b) the name and address of the responsible party; 
(c) the purpose for which the information is being collected; 
(d) whether or not the supply of the information by that data subject is volun-
tary or mandatory; 
(e) the consequences of failure to provide the information; 
(f) any particular law authorising or requiring the collection of the infor-
mation; 
(g) the fact that, where applicable, the responsible party intends to transfer the 
information to a third country or international organisation and the level of 
protection afforded to the information by that third country or international 
organisation; 
(h) any further information such as the— 
(i) recipient or category of recipients of the information; 
(ii) nature or category of the information; 
(iii) existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the information 
collected; 
(iv) existence of the right to object to the processing of personal information 
as referred to in section 11(3); and 
(v) right to lodge a complaint to the Information Regulator and the contact de-
tails of the Information Regulator, which is necessary, having regard to the 
specific circumstances in which the information is or is not to be processed, to 
enable processing in respect of the 
data subject to be reasonable. 
Part II 
Rights of data subjects and others 
7.—(1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and to 
Right of access to sections 8 and 9, an individual is entitled— 
personal data. 
(a) to be informed by any data controller whether personal data 
of which that individual is the data subject are being processed 
by or on behalf of that data controller, 
(b) if that is the case, to be given by the data controller a descrip-
tion of— 
(i) the personal data of which that individual is the data subject, 
(ii) the purposes for which they are being or are to be 
processed, and 
(iii) the recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or 
may be disclosed, 
(c) to have communicated to him in an intelligible form— 
(i) the information constituting any personal data of 
which that individual is the data subject, and 
(ii) any information available to the data controller as to the 
source of those data, and 
(d) where the processing by automatic means of personal data of 
which that individual is the data subject for the purpose of eval-
uating matters relating to him such as, for example, his perfor-
mance at work, his creditworthiness, his reliability or his con-
duct, has constituted or is likely to constitute the sole basis 
for any decision significantly affecting him, to be informed by 
the data controller of the logic involved in that decision-taking. 
 
Consumer noti-
fication of pur-
pose and other 
conditions of 
privacy 
Online privacy 
policy on website 
or in terms and 
conditions 
Secure pro-
cessing re-
quirement 
of websites 
Condition 7:  Security safeguards 
19. (1) A responsible party must secure the integrity and confidentiality of 
personal information in its possession or under its control by taking appropri-
ate, reasonable technical and organisational measures to prevent— 
(a) loss of, damage to or unauthorised destruction of personal information; 
and 
(b) unlawful access to or processing of personal information. 
Principle 7 
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be 
taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal 
data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, 
personal data. 
Ensure data in-
tegrity and con-
fidentiality  
Use of https on 
website 
Direct mar-
keting con-
sent 
Direct marketing by means of unsolicited electronic communications 
69. (1) The processing of personal information of a data subject for the pur-
pose of direct marketing by means of any form of electronic communication, 
including automatic calling machines, facsimile machines, SMSs or e-mail is 
prohibited unless the 
11.—(1) An individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing 
to a processing for data controller to require the data controller 
at the end of such period as purposes of direct is reasonable in 
the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing for 
Consumer pro-
vided with the 
option to choose 
Option provided 
on website to opt-
in to receive direct 
marketing com-
munication  
 
 
Condition / 
principle 
Regulatory requirement POPIA Regulatory requirement DPA Purpose Requirement to 
be tested 
data subject— 
(a) has given his, her or its consent to the processing; or 
(b) is, subject to subsection (3), a customer of the responsible party. 
(2) (a) A responsible party may approach a data subject— 
(i) whose consent is required in terms of subsection (1)(a); and 
(ii) who has not previously withheld such consent, 
only once in order to request the consent of that data subject. 
marketing. the purposes of direct marketing personal data in re-
spect of which he is the data subject. 
(2) If the court is satisfied, on the application of any person who 
has given a notice under subsection (1), that the data controller 
has failed to comply with the notice, the court may order him to 
take such steps for complying with the notice as the court thinks 
fit. 
(3) In this section “direct marketing” means the communication 
(by whatever means) of any advertising 
to receive mar-
keting commu-
nication 
Consent for 
3rd party 
sharing 
Condition 4: Further processing 
15. (1) Further processing of personal information must be in accordance or 
compatible with the purpose for which it was collected in terms of section 13. 
 
Condition 6: Openness 
18. (1) If personal information is collected, the responsible party must take 
reasonably practicable steps to ensure that the data subject is aware of— 
any further information such as the— 
(i) recipient or category of recipients of the information 
 
Condition 7: Security measures regarding information processed by op-
erator 
21. (1) A responsible party must, in terms of a written contract between the 
responsible party and the operator, ensure that the operator which processes 
personal information for the responsible party establishes and maintains the 
security measures referred to in section 19. 
Principle 2 
Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified 
and lawful purposes, and shall not be further processed in any 
manner incompatible with that purpose or those purposes. 
 
Schedule 3 Processing of sensitive personal data 
The processing— 
(d) does not involve disclosure of the personal data to a third 
party without the consent of the data subject. 
Notification  and 
consent for third 
party sharing 
Option to consent 
for  3rd party shar-
ing of PI 
Minimality 
principle 
Condition 2: Minimality 
10. Personal information may only be processed if, given the purpose for 
which it is processed, it is adequate, relevant and not excessive. 
Principle 3 
Personal data shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purpose or purposes for which they are pro-
cessed. 
Collecting the 
minimum fields 
of PI given the 
purpose 
Review fields of 
PI collected be in 
line with purpose 
and not excessive 
Collection 
of sensitive 
PI 
26. A responsible party may, subject to section 27, not process personal infor-
mation concerning— 
(a) the religious or philosophical beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union 
membership, political persuasion, health or sex life or biometric information 
of a data subject; or 
(b) the criminal behaviour of a data subject to the extent that such information 
relates to— 
(i) the alleged commission by a data subject of any offence; or 
(ii) any proceedings in respect of any offence allegedly committed by a data 
subject or the disposal of such proceedings. 
27. (1) The prohibition on processing personal information, as referred to in 
section 26, does not apply if the— 
“sensitive personal data” means personal data consisting  
of information as to - data. 
(a) the racial or ethnic origin of the data subject, 
(b) his political opinions, 
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, 
(d) whether he is a member of a trade union (within the mean-
ing of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) 
Act 1992 c. 52. 1992), 
(e) his physical or mental health or condition, 
(f) his sexual life, 
(g) the commission or alleged commission by him of any of-
fence, or 
Consent for spe-
cial personal in-
formation in line 
with purpose 
Review if special 
PI collected are in 
line with purpose 
 
 
Condition / 
principle 
Regulatory requirement POPIA Regulatory requirement DPA Purpose Requirement to 
be tested 
(a) processing is carried out with the consent of a data subject referred to in 
section 26; 
(b) processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defense of a 
right or obligation in law; 
(c) processing is necessary to comply with an obligation of international pub-
lic law; 
(d) processing is for historical, statistical or research purposes to the extent 
that 
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to 
have been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings 
or the sentence of any court in such proceedings. 
Table 2. Summary of regulatory requirements to be tested 
  
 
 
 
5 Research Methodology 
A multi-case study methodology with multiple units of analysis was utilised to conduct this research 
study (Yin, 2003).  The multi-case study methodology follows a replication logic through the selection 
of two countries, SA and UK. More than one unit of analysis are included in each country, namely ten 
short-term vehicle insurance organisations in each country. The privacy compliance requirement tests, 
as defined at the beginning of the research study in section four, are replicated across the organisations 
in each country. Ethical clearance for this research project was obtained through the relevant research 
ethics bodies at the University of South Africa (Unisa) and the University of Plymouth. Ethical clearance 
required data anonymisation and confidentiality of the organisations included in the sample, and there-
fore no organisation names or distinguishing characteristics are disclosed in the research result discus-
sion. 
5.1 Case Study Overview 
The insurance industry was selected for the research study due to several reasons. Firstly, the insurance 
industry processes large volumes of personal information (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2013) and are re-
garded as one of the industries that are affected by a large number of data breaches (PwC, 2015). Also, 
the insurance industry provides consumers with the service of obtaining online insurance quotes. During 
this process consumers deposit their PI online which enabled the researchers to conduct the case study 
to test the selected privacy requirements. The convenience sampling method was used to select the in-
surance organisations (Etikan et al., 2016).  
To facilitate the data depositing and data collection four new cellular phone SIM cards were linked to 
four newly created email addresses for each country, thus eight user profiles in total. In each country, 
two of the cellular numbers were used to opt in and the other two cellular numbers were used to opt out 
for direct marketing in order to monitor compliance with direct marketing preference (see Table 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Data depositing plan for the 10 organisations in each country  
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The researchers requested online quotes for each cell number and corresponding email. Thus, in SA the 
four SA profiles were used to request quotes at each of the ten insurance organisations with a total of 
forty online quotes. Similarly, forty online quotes were obtained in the UK. As such PI was deposited 
on the websites of the ten insurance organisations included in the sample for each country. The PI re-
quested on the websites, the use of HTTPS on the website and the availability of a privacy policy and/or 
disclaimer were noted during the depositing process. All cell phone calls, short messages (SMS) and 
emails received resulting from the request for an insurance quotation were recorded for a period of three 
months. 
In addition to POPIA, the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communi-
cation-related Information Act 70 of 2002 (RICA) (South Africa, 2003) also plays a role in the collection 
of PI in SA. RICA requires telecommunication organisations to verify the identity of a consumer through 
their personal identification documentation and to retain copies thereof. For one of the SA profiles the 
cell phone provider requested the personal identification documentation, but the second cell phone pro-
vider did not adhere to these requirements for verification. The UK cell phone provider did not require 
any PI when the SIM cards were purchased.  
6 Results 
All cellular telephone calls received, SMS and emails received were recorded in a MS-Excel spread-
sheet, noting the identity of the caller/contact, which organisation contacted the data subject, the nature 
of the contact, e.g. was it insurance related and if the data subject had opted in or opted out to receive 
any direct marketing communication from the insurance organisation. The evidence was quantified and 
analysed firstly per country and thereafter both countries results were compared and evaluated for dif-
ferences and/or similarities.   
6.1 Overview of PI Collected 
There was variation in the PI requested of the data subjects by the insurance organisations in the SA 
sample, whereas the PI requested by the UK insurance organisations was more consistent. Table 3 sum-
marises some of the PI requested to indicate the variation between the two countries.  
 
PI requested 
Number of websites 
PI requested 
Number of websites 
SA UK SA UK 
Name 9 10 Physical address 1 10 
Surname 8 10 Marital status 3 10 
ID 7 0 Vehicle registration number 1 10 
Gender 0 2 Secure parking  3 1 
Birth date 0 10 Driving with disability/medical condition 1 2 
Cell phone 9 10 Driving record (judgment) 1 10 
Email address 7 10 General vehicle details  (e.g. model, 
model, year) 
5 10 
Table 3. PI requested 
In SA, a person’s identity number can be utilised to deduce their birth date, age and gender (Western 
Cape Government, 2016), and this number was validated as part of the online request for authenticity. 
Where the email address was not requested by the SA websites, the cell number was requested and vice 
versa. One of the SA websites requested information about disability status. This is classified as “special 
personal” information by POPIA, as it falls under health information (South Africa 2013, s 26), which 
may not be processed unless consent is obtained, or certain other provisions apply. Of concern is that 
this website was also one of the websites that did not include an option for direct marketing preferences. 
 
 
In comparison, the UK insurance organisations requested a wider, but consistent range of PI. The UK 
does not have a national identity programme, and therefore none of the UK insurance organisations 
asked for an identity number. The insurance premium paid by drivers is based on their physical address, 
which is why all organisations requested this information. Two insurance organisations requested infor-
mation on whether the insurer had a medical condition that requires the Driver and Vehicle Licensing 
Agency (DVLA) to be notified.    
6.2 Opt-in/opt-out Preferences for Direct Marketing  
During the data depositing phase, the availability of an opt-in or opt-out option for direct marketing was 
recorded to establish and verify whether responsible parties honoured the data subject’s choice during 
subsequent contacts. In the South African sample, only two organisations gave the data subject the 
choice of either opting in or opting out when it came to receiving direct marketing communication (see 
Table 4). In the case of two of the SA organisations, the data subject could not proceed with the online 
insurance quotation request unless the opt-in option was selected (mandatory opt-in). In the SA context, 
six organisations did not provide either an opt-in or an opt-out option. By contrast, eight of the UK 
organisations provided an opt-in or opt-out option from which the data subject was free to choose. The 
remaining two UK organisations set the opt-in by default, with the data subject being able to ask to 
change their status to opt-out via email or by completing an online opt-out form.    
 
Options  SA (10 websites) UK (10 websites) 
Opt in/opt out preference available 2 8 
Mandatory opt-in 2 2 
Use of opt-out form 0 2 
No option 6 0 
Table 4. Opt-in/opt-out options: SA versus UK 
6.3 Use of Privacy Policy  
The availability (or absence) of a privacy policy or terms and conditions was noted during the data 
depositing process. Where nine UK organisations had a privacy policy on their websites and one UK 
organisation had a privacy notice in terms and conditions on its website. In comparison, five SA organ-
isations had a privacy policy on their websites and also five organisations had a privacy notice in terms 
and conditions on their websites. 
6.4 Security Processing on Websites Using HTTPS 
All the organisations included in the UK sample used HTTPS on their websites to process PI for the 
purpose of the online quotation requests. However, the website of one SA organisation did not. 
6.5 Sharing Of PI with Third Parties 
None of the SA or UK websites had a third party sharing option or notification at the point of collection. 
Only one SA organisation had a notice indicating that information would not be shared; however, no 
option was available to the participant to opt out of third party sharing. 
Table 5 sets out the number of contacts received for the opt-out and opt-in profiles in SA and the UK. 
Of concern is the number of contacts received from organisations that were not part of the sample. In 
all, 42 contacts were received that were not part of the sample for two of the profiles in SA (20 in the 
opt-in and 22 in the opt-out group). This indicates that third parties that were not part of the sample 
contacted the data subjects for direct marketing. The contacts varied from competitions to win airtime, 
to offers of funeral cover, to product promotions. In comparison, the UK profiles only received contacts 
from the sampling insurance organisations, regardless of whether they were opt-in or opt-out.  
 
 
 
OPT-IN CONTACTS  SA TOTAL UK TOTAL 
Part of sam-
ple 
  
  
  
SMS - quote follow-up  2 0 
Calls - quote follow-up 19 1 
Email - quote follow-up 15 8 
Email - promotional 3 12 
Total opt-in part of sample 39 21 
Not part of 
sample 
  
  
  
  
SMS 18 0 
Calls 0 0 
Email 0 0 
Email – promotional 2 0 
Total opt-in not part of sample 20 0 
Total Opt-In Contacts 59 21 
OPT-OUT CONTACTS SA TOTAL UK TOTAL 
Part of sam-
ple 
  
  
  
  
SMS - quote follow-up  4 0 
Calls - quote follow-up 16 0 
Email - quote follow-up 7 8 
Email - promotional 6 7 
Total opt-out part of sample 33 15 
Not part of 
sample 
  
  
  
  
SMS 21 0 
Calls 0 0 
Email 0 0 
Email - promotional 1 0 
Total opt-out not part of sample 22 0 
Total Opt-Out Contacts 55 15 
Table 5. Summary of contacts received 
 
Regarding the opt-in and opt-out preferences, 59 and 55 contacts were received by the opt-in profile and 
opt-out profile respectively in SA, while 21 and 15 contacts were received by the UK opt-in profile and 
opt-out profile accordingly. The promotional emails received included retail advertisements as well as 
those relating to insurance. It is not clear whether these were received as a possible result of email 
profiling or whether they were related to sharing of the email addresses by the organisations in the 
sample. The 13 promotional emails (six from SA profiles and seven from UK profiles) received as part 
of the opt-out profile were a concern, as the data subject elected not to receive direct marketing as part 
of this profile. 
 
6.6 Minimality Principle 
 
The websites included in the SA sample collected up to 31 fields of PI. Table 6 illustrates the total fields 
of PI collected per organisation as well as the PI fields that could be deemed as excessive in column 3. 
It is interesting to note that organisation six collected the most fields of PI and in additional also collected 
sensitive PI such as health (paraplegic, amputee) and criminal PI. Other fields of PI such as the national 
identification number, dates of when the consumer received his/her first vehicle licence and the em-
ployer might also be unnecessary PI for the purpose a vehicle insurance quote. Fields relating to the 
 
 
consumers’ name and surname as well as contact details are relevant to enable the organisation to follow 
up on the quote. The vehicle information is necessary as well as physical address information which 
could affect the amount quoted. However, care should be taken to no collect excessive PI which in-
creases the legal obligations of the organisations to secure the information and protect the confidentiality 
thereof as well as to keep it updated. In contrast the organisations in the UK collected consistent PI With 
some fields that could be considered excessive.  
 
Organisations Total fields of 
PI collected 
Excessive PI collected Excessive 
SA Organisation 1 14 Identification number, type of licence, car descrip-
tion 
Yes 
SA Organisation 2 8 None No 
SA Organisation 3 5 Identification number Yes 
SA Organisation 4 14 Identification number, date of first license, marital 
status 
Yes 
SA Organisation 5 5 Identification number Yes 
SA Organisation 6 31 Identification number, other vehicle information, 
driving with glasses, driving as amputee, driving as 
paraplegic, judgement in last five years, declared 
insolvent, declared bankrupt, under administration, 
under debt review, with whom car is financed, pre-
vious insurance, insurance history, marital status 
Yes 
SA Organisation 7 2 None No 
SA Organisation 8 20 Identification number, with whom car is financed, 
vehicle registration number, new or second hand,  
marital status 
Yes 
SA Organisation 9 4 Identification number Yes 
SA Organisation 10 1 None No 
UK Organisation 1 19 Marital status, employer Yes 
UK Organisation 2 20 Marital status, employer, gender Yes 
UK Organisation 3 20 Marital status, employer, gender Yes 
UK Organisation 4 19 Marital status, health, employer Yes 
UK Organisation 5 17 Marital status  Yes 
UK Organisation 6 18 Marital status Yes 
UK Organisation 7 21 Marital status, employer, declared bankrupt Yes 
UK Organisation 8 20 Marital status, employer,  Yes 
UK Organisation 9 22 Marital status, employer, declared bankrupt Yes 
UK Organisation 10 25 Marital status, landline, health, employer, declared 
bankrupt,   
Yes 
Table 6. Summary of excessive PI collected 
 
Table 6 illustrates the total fields of PI collected per organisation as well as the PI fields that could be 
deemed as excessive. The total fields of PI collected by the selected SA organisations are different, 
ranging from 1 to 31. In addition to the minimal requirement, the organisation that collected 31 fields 
of PI also gathered sensitive PI such as such as health (paraplegic, amputee) and criminal PI. Amongst 
those excessive PI categories, PI such as the national identification number, and the employer might 
also be deemed to be unnecessary for the purpose a vehicle insurance quote. A number of SA organisa-
tions only collected a few fields of PI with no SA company asking for gender or employer information. 
 
 
This a good from the minimality principle standpoint of view; nonetheless, the quotes from those or-
ganisations may not be as accurate as the ones offered by the organisations required more PI.  Little 
difference is presented by the total pieces of PI collected by the UK organisations, ranging from 17 to 
25, with three UK organisation that collected information about bankruptcy which might be excessive. 
In addition most UK organisations asked about the consumers’ marital status and employer.  
 
6.7 Sensitive PI 
Only one organisation in the SA sample requested sensitive PI. Organisation six required the consumer 
to declare whether he/she drives with glasses, drive as an amputee, drive as a paraplegic, had a judge-
ment in the last five years, was declared insolvent, was declared bankrupt or was under administration 
or under debt review. While the consumer can willingly supply the sensitive PI it increases the risk for 
the organisation collecting the PI. The responsible organisation must ensure that appropriate security 
measures are in place when the PI is transferred and stored in order to protect the confidentiality thereof. 
Additional storage space is required and processes to ensure that the data is kept up to date and protected 
throughout its life cycle. In the event of a data breach the exposed sensitive information could result in 
a higher impact of reputational damage for the organisation as well as the consumer. Two of the UK 
organisations enquired about the consumer’s health, which could also increase the risk of protecting the 
information. 
 
7 Discussions 
Table 7 provides a summary of the aspects tested in the multi-case study with the results for SA and the 
UK, and the related observation and recommendations. In the SA context the opt-out preference and 
third party sharing are of concern – it would appear that organisations do not yet comply with the POPIA 
requirements. In the UK, the case study data shows that the data collectors do not share PI with third 
party organisations; nonetheless, individual preference for the opt-out option is not fully honoured, as 
those who chose the opt-out option were contacted seven times via email and in addition the minimality 
principle does not seem to be applied. 
 
Requirement SA UK Observation  Recommendation 
Opt-in/opt-out 
available on 
website 
2 8 The SA websites did not comply with 
this option, although the CPA requires 
an opt-out option for direct marketing.  
Most of the UK websites provided an 
opt-in/opt-out option. 
Opt-in/out preferences for 
direct marketing should be 
provided on websites at the 
point of data collection. 
Privacy policy on 
website or in terms 
and conditions 
10 10 All SA and UK websites had a privacy 
policy or included privacy in their terms 
and conditions. 
N/A 
Secure website 
using HTTPS 
9 10 One of the SA organisations did not 
have a secure website, whereas all the 
UK organisations did. 
SA organisations should 
ensure secure processing of 
PI using for example 
HTTPS. 
Third party sharing 
(Number of third 
party contacts 
received) 
42 0 A number of contacts were received 
from organisations that were not part of 
the SA sample. It is possible that the 
insurance organisations or the 
telecommunication organisations shared 
the data subject’s PI without the data 
subject’s knoweldge or consent. In 
comparison, the UK profiles did not 
SA organisations should 
ensure that PI is processed 
lawfully and implement 
measures to ensure that it is 
not shared with 
unauthorised third parties 
e.g. policy updates, 
training and awareness to 
 
 
receive anything that was not from the 
sampling insurance organisations. 
staff, further processing 
approval process. 
Honouring of opt-
out 
(Uncolicited 
promotional emails 
received) 
6 7 A few promotional emails were received 
in the opt-out group of the SA and UK 
profiles. This might be related to the 
profiling of the email accounts. 
SA and UK Organisations 
should maintain opt-in and 
opt-out preferences of 
consumers and exclude 
consumers from direct 
marketig if they opted out.  
Minimality 
principle 
7 10 More of the UK organisations in the 
sample collected excessive PI than the 
organisations in the SA sample, while 
one organisation in the SA sample 
collected excessive and sensitive PI. 
SA and UK organisations 
should review data 
collection forms and 
remove requests for 
excessive PI that is not 
necessary to achieve the 
purpose. 
Senstive personal 
information 
1 2 One of the SA organisations collected 
health and criminal PI which are 
classfied as senstive PI. 
SA and UK organisations 
should not collect sensitive 
PI and should remove the 
collection thereof from 
collection forms where it is 
not necessary to achieve 
the purpose. 
Table 7. Synopsis of results: SA versus UK 
The results of this research study indicate that in a country where there is enacted data privacy legislation 
with an active regulator, the organisations in the sample were more compliant with data privacy condi-
tions than those in a country with pending data privacy legislation. In the UK, the ICO has become more 
prominent in terms of issuing enforcement actions (which can include monetary penalties and 
prosecutions) in relation to breaches of the DPA. Indeed, 2017 saw an increase of over 100% in the 
number of enforcements, and an almost 50% increase in the value of associated fines; the total value of 
fines has increased significantly over time, as shown in Table 8.  
 
Year Number of fines Total value 
2010 2 £160,000 
2011 7 £541,100 
2012 17 £2,143,000 
2013 14 £1,520,000 
2014 9 £668,500 
2015 18 £2,031,250 
2016 21 £2,155,500 
2017 (Aug) 44 £3,107,500 
Table 8. ICO fines 2010–2017 (Metzger, 2017) 
In future, the introduction of new legislation will deliver even greater power to persuade and to prosecute 
non-compliance. To date, the ICO has issued fines of up to £500,000 for DPA contraventions, although 
in practice it has not issued any above £400,000.  However, the permitted threshold will increase signif-
icantly with the introduction of the GDPR in May 2018 (Leyden, 2017).  Specifically, the GDPR will 
permit penalties of up to €20 million or 4% of annual global turnover (whichever is higher). Thus, the 
incentive to comply, and the price of not doing so, will be even greater. 
The research results indicate the insurance organisations in the UK sample were more compliant than 
their SA counterparts. This can be attributed to the longer time frame that the DPA has been in place, 
the active Regulator and trend of fines imposed. This supports to the work of the DLA Piper that cate-
gorises the UK as a country with a heavy stance towards privacy whereas SA is categorised as low (DLA 
 
 
Piper 2018). The SA insurance industry can leverage the results in this study to improve their opt-in/opt-
out provisions on organisation websites and to further improve its processes of data sharing with third 
parties to ensure that it complies with the provisions of POPIA by obtaining consent for direct marketing 
and for third party sharing. The UK can focus on implementing measures to comply with provisions for 
unsolicited marketing in order to honour opt-in and opt-out preferences, to implement measures to obtain 
consent prior to sending direct marketing material and to meet the requirements of the minimality prin-
ciple. 
8 Limitations 
The sample was limited to 10 insurance organisations in SA and the UK, which could be expanded to a 
larger sample for future research. Although the insurance industry is categorised under the financial 
sector, it would be advantageous to expand the research sample to other financial sector organisations. 
The availability of a website policy or disclaimer was noted; however the analysis of website policy 
content fell outside the scope of this research.  In the SA context, contacts received via the cell phone 
numbers could be the result of previous ownership of a cell phone number, as in this country cell phone 
numbers are reassigned.  
9   Conclusion  
The study aimed to compare the process of handling and processing of PI within the online insurance 
environment across the UK and SA which have difference in terms of privacy adoption/maturity. None-
theless, the fundamental of both sets of legislations is similar in terms of privacy requirements. In terms 
of practice, enforcement of regulation appears to be key while maturity also plays a key role, with UK-
based practice being more compliance to legislative requirements. With SA still being at an early stage 
of implementation of the POPIA, with little degree of enforcement, it is left up to organisations to de-
termine suitable policies with regard to PI while preparing for compliance; unfortunately, some chose 
to monetise rather than to protect the data as evident obtained from this research study. Despite this is a 
common trend prior to full adoption and enforcement of appropriate legislation, organisations in SA 
should leverage the results to identify gaps in compliance with POPIA while learning from UK organi-
sations to define their compliance plans.  
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